Introduction
The Prisoner's Dilemma is a widely used mathematical model of interactions between individuals with partially con#icting goals. In this paradoxical 2;2 non-zero sum game, each player must choose whether to cooperate for mutual bene"t or to defect for individual bene"t (harming the other player). The outcomes of the Prisoner's Dilemma game are given in the following payo! table (Table 1) .
If both players cooperate, each receives the payo! R as a reward for mutual cooperation. If both players defect, each receives the payo! P as a punishment for defecting. If one player defects while the other cooperates, the defector receives payo! ¹ (as a temptation to defect), while the cooperator receives the sucker payo! S. The Prisoner's Dilemma is de"ned by ¹'R'P'S. Additionally, 2R'¹#S, so cooperation achieves more points than alternating ¹ and S payo!s. What is the optimal strategy for the Prisoner's Dilemma? It is clear that mutual cooperation is preferable to mutual defection, but in the oneshot Prisoner's Dilemma game, no matter what the other player chooses, a player can achieve a higher payo! by defection. Hence the optimal strategy is to defect, and mutual defection is the only rational result of a one-shot Prisoner's Dilemma. An Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma (IPD) occurs when a Prisoner's Dilemma interaction is repeated by the same players over a number of rounds. Based on past results, reciprocal altruism can develop, enabling mutual cooperation to become a rational option. A strategy for the IPD is an algorithm for deciding whether or not to cooperate on a given round, based on the results of previous rounds. It is clear that some strategies are better than others. If a player cooperates too often, the other player can take advantage of him by defecting; if he defects too often, the other player is likely to retaliate, resulting in low scores for both players. Since a strategy's performance in the IPD is highly dependent on the other player's strategy as well as the speci"c parameters of the game, it is much less obvious as to what an &&optimal'' IPD strategy would be, or even how &&optimal'' should be de"ned. In 1980, Robert Axelrod conducted a computer &&tournament'' in which 14 strategies designed by leading game theorists were matched against each other. The winning strategy was ¹it for ¹at (¹F¹), submitted by Anatol Rapoport. This strategy cooperates initially, then echoes what the other player chose in the last round (Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981) . Tit for Tat is very successful in many variants of the Prisoner's Dilemma game, and its success has sparked theories of the evolution of cooperation based upon reciprocity (Axelrod, 1984) . These models have been applied to "elds ranging from economics to biology (e.g. Maynard Smith, 1982; Axelrod, 1984; Milinski, 1987) .
Tit for Tat, however, is clearly not successful in an iterated Prisoner's Dilemma with &&noise'', a non-zero probability that a player's decision will be transmitted incorrectly. In an IPD interaction between two ¹F¹ strategies, a single accidental defection can lead to an endless sequence of mutual recriminations (Nowak & Sigmund, 1990) . Various other strategies have been examined for the the noisy iterated Prisoner's Dilemma, including the Pavlov (Win-Stay, Lose-Switch) strategy, which cooperates only after mutual cooperation or mutual defection. Pavlov is an &&er-ror correcting'' strategy: against its clone, it can recover from an accidental defection, resuming mutual cooperation in a relatively small number of rounds (Kraines & Kraines, 1989 .
The Alternating Prisoner's Dilemma (APD) is a variant of the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma in which the players alternate in the roles of actor and recipient rather than acting simultaneously (Nowak & Sigmund, 1994; Frean, 1994) . In this game, players alternate turns, and on each player's turn he must choose whether to cooperate or defect. This game models many situations in which participants must take turns in helping each other, such as gift-giving, or bipartisan cooperation in politics. Alternating reciprocal altruism is also commonly observed in animal behavior: for example, South American vampire bats who have found a good meal will help hungry bats by donating some of their surplus food (Wilkinson, 1984) . In this sort of interaction, only one bat (the one with food) makes a decision to cooperate; this cooperation is likely to be reciprocated by other bats during future feedings. Similarly, an Alternating Prisoner's Dilemma is observed in the guarding behavior of the dwarf mongoose (Rasa, 1989) . When a group leaves the termite mound where it has roosted for the night, one member (a subadult male) will stay behind and maintain a watch for predators, increasing its own risk in order to protect the group. At the next mound, another individual will run ahead and establish the next watch, while the rearguard rejoins the pack. In this example, the guarding animal must make a choice between displaying 160 D. B. NEILL vigilant guard behavior (cooperation) or focusing on its own safety (defection). Examples of alternating reciprocal altruism can also be seen in the "ghting of young male baboons (Trivers, 1985) . In these examples, it makes no sense for the players to cooperate simultaneously (Nowak & Sigmund, 1994) , so the standard Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma does not model the situation as well as the Alternating Prisoner's Dilemma.
To simplify our calculations, we focus on a &&strictly alternating'' Prisoner's Dilemma between two players, A and B (i.e. A gets one turn, then B gets one turn, every round). Player A's choices are denoted in upper case (C or D) , and player B's choices are denoted in lower case (c or d). To keep score, we treat each turn after the "rst one as if it were a complete Prisoner's Dilemma, and thus each player receives two payo!s every round. For example, consider an APD game which starts at CdDc. This means that, on the "rst turn, Player A chooses C. Since it is the "rst turn, neither player receives a payo!. On the second turn, Player B chooses d. Since Player A's last choice was C, A receives a sucker payo! S, and B receives a temptation payo! ¹. On the third turn, Player A chooses D. Since Player B's last choice was d, both players receive a punishment payo! P. On the fourth turn, Player B chooses c. Since player A's last choice was D, A receives a temptation payo! ¹, and B receives a sucker payo! S. Thus after the sequence CdDc, each player has received a total payo! of ¹#P#S. This process continues inde"nitely, with players receiving payo!s based on the last two turns.
Though some have argued that the IPD and the APD are mathematically equivalent (Axelrod, 1984) , the two games can result in dramatically di!erent interactions between strategies. For example, in an IPD game between two Tit for Tat players, a single accidental defection leads to a sequence of alternating temptation and sucker payo!s, while in an APD game, an error leads to a sequence of punishment payo!s. As a result, strategies may be successful in IPD but not APD interactions, or vice versa. For example, two Pavlov players quickly restore mutual cooperation after an error in the IPD (CD DD CC CC 2 ), but in the APD an error leads to a 6-turn cycle of temptation, punishment, and sucker payo!s (CdDcDdCdDcDd 2 ). Thus the Pavlov strategy is`self-cooperatinga in the IPD but not the APD. The Firm but Fair (FBF) strategy, which cooperates except after receiving a sucker payo!, is self-coooperating in the APD but not the IPD (Frean, 1994) . Two FBF players can restore mutual cooperation after an error in the APD (CdDcCc 2 ), but in the IPD an error leads to alternating temptation and sucker payo!s (CD DC CD DC 2 ). From these examples, it is clear that the IPD and APD are distinct problems, and successful strategies for one game may perform poorly in the other.
n-ply strategies for the Alternating
Prisoner:s Dilemma
We now de"ne some strategies which are commonly discussed in the Alternating Prisoner's Dilemma literature, and introduce the general notion of an &&n-ply'' strategy. The n-move history of a game is a string of C's and
, where h I "C if a player cooperated k turns ago, and h I "D if a player defected k turns ago. Odd indices correspond to the opponent's moves, and even indices correspond to the player's moves. The opponent's moves are generally written in lower case, and the player's moves in upper case. For example, a 3-move history of cCd would mean that the opponent's most recent move was defection, the player's most recent move was cooperation, and the opponent's previous move was cooperation.
We can enumerate the 2L possible history strings H in a lexicographic order, with H "
D2Dd. An n-ply strategy for the APD chooses whether to cooperate or defect based on the n-move history H. The strategy is de"ned by 2L numbers (a 2 a L ), where 0)a G )1 for all i, and each a G corresponds to the probability of cooperation if H"H G . For example, the 2-ply strategy (1 0 1 0.2) will cooperate if H"H or H"H , that is, if the 2-move history is Cc or Dc. Similarly, it will defect if the 2-move history is Cd, and cooperate with probability 0.2 if Dd.
The commonly discussed 1-ply strategies include A¸¸C (1 1), A¸¸D (0 0), ¹F¹ (1 0), and Random ( ). The commonly discussed 2-ply strategies include Pavlov (1 0 0 1), Firm But Fair (1 0 1 1), and the &&generous strategies'' g1 (1 1 ), g2 (1 1 ), and g3 (1 1 ). We can also form a 2-ply strategy by a trivial extension of a 1-ply strategy: the 2-ply strategy (a b a b) behaves equivalently to the 1-ply strategy (a b). In general, the n-ply strategy S L is equivalent to the n#1-ply strategy formed by concatenating S L with itself.
To fully specify an n-ply strategy, we should also specify its behavior at the start of the game (turns 1..n). We generally assume that h I "C for k*n, that is, &&moves'' in the history list before the start of the game are assumed to be cooperation. For example, on the "rst turn of a game, a 3-ply strategy will assume that the history is H"cCc. Alternatively, we can average over all possible initial history sequences.
What Does it Mean to be Optimal?
The question of what makes a strategy &&opti-mal'' in the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma or Alternating Prisoner's Dilemma is very di$cult to answer. As many researchers have noted, the performance of a strategy is highly dependent on which other strategies it interacts with; this has led to several con#icting de"nitions of the term &&optimality'', with resulting di!erences in which strategies (if any) are considered optimal. According to one line of argument, optimality is de"ned relative to a given set of opponents: the optimal strategy is the one which achieves the highest score (with respect to some measure) against that set of opponents. One typical measure of performance is the average score in a round-robin tournament interaction. As we shall prove, no "xed strategy performs best against every given set of opponents in a round-robin tournament interaction, and this has caused many to argue that no optimal strategy exists.
However, there are three main problems with this argument. First, it is not clear that we should limit our search to &&"xed'' strategies: given a su$-ciently long game length, it may be possible for a strategy to achieve success against an opponent by making a large number of exploratory moves, constructing and testing hypotheses which describe the opponent's behavior, and thus adapting over time. Such strategies are beyond the scope of this paper; we consider only those strategies whose behavior is governed by simple, "xed rules. Second, it is not clear if a round-robin interaction is the best measure of &&success'' on which to base our de"nition of optimality. Numerous other measures have been proposed, including various measures of success in evolutionary interactions. We consider many of these &&evolutionary optimality criteria'' later in the paper, and propose our own measure of evolutionary success. This measure, which we call &&evolutionary dominance'', is a combination of evolutionary stability (ability to resist invasion) and evolutionary potency (ability to invade other strategies). Nevertheless, all of these measures depend on the choice of opponents; it is clear that if we require an &&optimal'' strategy to be optimal with respect to every given set of opponents, most reasonable measures will conclude that no optimal strategy exists.
The third, and most profound, objection to this argument questions the idea that &&optimal'' strategies must be most successful with respect to every given set of opponents. In the real world, organisms must react to an uncertain environment; they are likely to have limited and incomplete knowledge, and must act in the best way they can, given this knowledge. Thus we ask the following question: what is the best "xed strategy for an organism to choose, assuming no prior knowledge of the set of opponents? An optimal choice of strategy is one which maximizes its expected success under uncertainty, given the information and options available to it. In other words, we consider a strategy optimal if no other known strategy is expected to achieve a higher performance in this uncertain environment. Thus we use an inductive approach to optimality, one which bears a distinct resemblance to the modern scienti"c method: a strategy is considered optimal until we discover a strategy which is demonstrably &&better''.
In order to apply this method, we must propose and examine &&optimality criteria'', standards for evaluating the general performance of a strategy. If we de"ne a reasonable set of criteria, strategies which meet these criteria are clearly preferable to those which do not: by de"ning increasingly strict criteria, we can eliminate nonoptimal strategies and gradually narrow down the possibilities for an optimal strategy. If we limit the domain of strategies under consideration (for example, all n-ply strategies), we may even be able to "nd a single strategy which is clearly optimal in that domain.
The question remains: how do we de"ne these optimality criteria? It is clear from our de"nition that an optimal strategy must perform with a high degree of relative success in interactions with many other sets of strategies. Thus we search for criteria which are strongly correlated with a high average performance. In other words, it is not su$cient to propose criteria and consider a strategy &&optimal'' if it meets these standards. It is also necessary to show that strategies which meet the criteria are highly successful against a wide variety of strategies (with respect to such established criteria as round-robin tournament performance), for otherwise our chosen criteria would be useless.
Before de"ning the optimality criteria, we "rst attempt to gain a general idea of what it means for a strategy to be &&successful'' in an Alternating Prisoner's Dilemma interaction. We consider a single, in"nitely long APD game between two strategies X and >. The goal of each strategy is to maximize its average payo! per turn,
where p(i) is the payo! received by that strategy after turn i. Though the in"nite game length is an idealization of real-life interactions, it serves as a good approximation of situations in which the probability of further encounters is high (Nowak & Sigmund, 1994) . Kraines and Kraines show that average payo!s in 4-round and 8-round games are closely approximated by the in"nite game (2000) . Thus even short games can be modeled closely by this assumption, as long as the players believe that the game will continue.
We denote the expected value of the payo! w to strategy X in an in"nitely long game against strategy > as w(X">). In particular, we de"ne w(X"X), the &&self-payo! '' of strategy X, to be the expected value of its payo! w in an in"nitely long game against its clone. In certain cases (i.e. interactions between deterministic strategies with no noise), payo!s may vary depending on which strategy goes "rst. In these cases, we average the two possibilities. We assume that an APD strategy X will interact with many di!erent strategies > over time, and thus the strategy's goal is to maximize its average payo! against all strategies it interacts with. Assuming a population of opponents > G with varying frequencies f (> G ), with
The relative success of two strategies X and > can be evaluated by comparing w(X) and w(>): strategies with higher w are considered to be more successful. What characteristics must a strategy have for it to achieve relative success against a wide variety of other strategies? Two things in#uence a strategy's payo! on any given turn: a strategy scores higher if it defects, and if its opponent cooperates. Thus a strategy X should choose to cooperate with a strategy > only if cooperating will make > signi"cantly more likely to cooperate on future turns. In particular, a strategy should be able to exploit unconditional cooperators, as well as prevent other strategies from exploiting it. It should also cooperate with nice, but unexploitable, strategies such as Tit for Tat. Thus one possibility for the optimality criteria would be to consider a strategy's scores against A¸¸C, A¸¸D, and ¹F¹. However, since ¹F¹ performs poorly in games with noise, and choosing any speci"c variation of ¹F¹ adds a subjective bias to our criteria, we choose instead to consider a strategy's score against its clone. Strategies which can achieve cooperation with their clones are likely to cooperate with a wide range of other strategies, while strategies which do not cooperate with their clones are unlikely to achieve cooperation with most other strategies.
Combining these desired characteristics, we "nd that an &&optimal'' strategy must possess three essential properties. It must be &&self-cooperating'' (able to achieve mutual cooperation with its clone), &&unexploitable'' (able to resist exploitation by A¸¸D and other strategies), and &&exploiting'' (able to exploit unconditional cooperators). We will show that strategies which meet these simple criteria are able to achieve remarkable success with respect to a variety of OPTIMALITY UNDER NOISE measures, including a round-robin tournament simulation. These properties are also essential for success in the &&evolutionary'' APD, in which a strategy's payo! w is used as a measure of its reproductive "tness (Maynard Smith & Price, 1973) . Strategies which receive higher payo!s are able to produce more o!spring, while those with poor performance quickly die o!, and thus the population of strategies evolves over time. In the evolutionary APD, an &&optimal'' strategy should be able to invade and resist invasion by other strategies. According to Maynard Smith's de"nition (1982) ,
We will discuss the evolutionary APD, de"ning a more precise measure of evolutionary &&dominance'', but for now we simply consider a strategy's evolutionary interactions with unconditional cooperators (the A¸¸C strategy) and unconditional defectors (the A¸¸D strategy). An optimal strategy should be able to evolve cooperation by invading a population of defectors and establishing a cooperative &&society''. Once established, this society should be &&stable'' enough to resist invasion by defectors, as well as resisting genetic drift, the in"ltration of the population by unconditional cooperators. Strategies which are unexploitable and self-cooperating can establish a stable cooperative society of this sort, and strategies which are exploiting can resist genetic drift. We will also show that the strategies meeting these criteria are extremely successful in evolutionary interactions with a wide variety of other strategies, with success de"ned by the measure of &&evolutionary dominance''.
OPTIMALITY CRITERIA
We de"ne three criteria for optimality, &&self-cooperating'', &&C-exploiting'', and &&D-unexploitable''. We "rst de"ne a &&self-cooperating'' strategy in terms of its self-payo! w(X"X), comparing this to the self-payo!s of A¸¸D (the lowest possible self-payo! ) and A¸¸C (the highest possible self-payo! ):
w(A¸¸D"A¸¸D). A strategy X is totally self-cooperating if w(X"X)"w(A¸¸C"A¸¸C).
Next, we de"ne a &&C-exploiting'' strategy in terms of its payo! against A¸¸C, again comparing this to the payo!s of A¸¸D (maximum) and A¸¸C (minimum).
De5nition 2. A strategy X is C-exploiting if w(X"A¸¸C)'w(A¸¸C"A¸¸C). A strategy X is totally C-exploiting if w(X"A¸¸C)" w(A¸¸D"A¸¸C).
Third, we de"ne a &&D-unexploitable'' strategy in terms of its payo! against A¸¸D, again comparing this to the payo!s of A¸¸D (maximum) and A¸¸C (minimum).
De5nition 3. A strategy X is D-unexploitable if w(X"A¸¸D)'w(A¸¸C"A¸¸D). A strategy X is totally D-unexploitable if w(X"A¸¸D)" w(A¸¸D"A¸¸D).
More generally, we de"ne the &&relative performance'' of strategy X against strategy > to be
Thus 7 (X)"1 if X achieves the maximum possible score against >, and 7 (X)"0 if X achieves the minimum possible score against >. We now consider the &&relative performance'' of strategy X against A¸¸C and A¸¸D, which we denote by ! and " , respectively:
,
w(X"A¸¸D)!w(A¸¸C"A¸¸D) w(A¸¸D"A¸¸D)!w(A¸¸C"A¸¸D)
.
Thus, a strategy is &&C-exploiting'' if ! '0, and &&totally C-exploiting'' if ! "1. Similarly, a strategy is &&D-unexploitable'' if " '0, and &&totally D-unexploitable'' if " "1. Note that each of these quantities is the proportion of defections by X against A¸¸C or A¸¸D, respectively.
TABLE 2 values for no noise APD
We also de"ne the &&relative self-performance'' of a strategy to be
Note that a strategy is &&self-cooperating'' if 1 '0, and &&totally self-cooperating'' if 1 "1. Now we consider what values a strategy must have to be considered &&optimal''. A &&perfectly optimal'' strategy X should attain the maximum possible score against all strategies >: that is,
However, a simple argument shows that this is impossible to achieve:
Proposition 1. No perfectly optimal strategy exists.
See Appendix A for proof. We now consider strategies which are optimal in their interactions with cooperators and defectors. To quantify this, we apply the Maynard Smith criteria. For X to invade A¸¸C, w(X"A¸¸C)'w(A¸¸C"A¸¸C), which implies ! '0. For X to invade A¸¸D, w(X"A¸¸D)"w(A¸¸D"A¸¸D) and w(X"X)' w(A¸¸D"X), which implies " "1 and 1 '0. For X to resist invasion by A¸¸C, w(X"X)* w(A¸¸C"X). Solving for w(X"X) in terms of 1 , and w(A¸¸C"X) in terms of ! , we obtain
For X to resist invasion by A¸¸D, w(X"X)' w(A¸¸D"X). Solving for w (X"X) in terms of 1 , and w(A¸¸D"X) in terms of "
, we obtain
We de"ne a &&strongly optimal'' strategy as one which can invade and take over a population of defectors, establishing total self-cooperation, and resist invasion by A¸¸D and A¸¸C. A &&weakly optimal'' strategy can invade and take over a population of defectors, establishing some degree of self-cooperation, and resist invasion by A¸¸D and A¸¸C. This implies: De5nition 4. A strongly optimal strategy is a strategy with " "1, 1 "1, and ! '0.
De5nition 5. A weakly optimal strategy is a strategy with " "1, 1 '0, and ! '((R!P)/ (R!S))(1! 1 ).
We now consider these criteria for APD games withm varying amounts of noise.
OPTIMALITY CRITERIA FOR NO NOISE APD
In the no noise APD, we assume that errors do not occur; a strategy always makes the choice (cooperation or defection) that it intends to make. Thus we know that w(A¸¸C"A¸¸C)"R, w(A¸¸D"A¸¸D)"P, w(A¸¸C"A¸¸D)"S, and w(A¸¸D"A¸¸C)"¹ for the no noise APD. Thus
, and " "(w(X"A¸¸D)!S)/(P!S). We now consider the strategies which are most commonly discussed in the Prisoner's Dilemma: Tit for Tat (¹F¹), Generous Tit For Tat (G¹F¹), A¸¸C, A¸¸D, Pavlov (PA<), and Firm But Fair (FBF). We compute 1 , ! , and " for each strategy in an APD with no noise (Table 2) .
As can be seen from the table, none of these strategies are even weakly optimal. ¹F¹ is closest to optimal, since it can invade a population of defectors and establish complete cooperation. However, since ¹F¹ does not exploit unconditional cooperators, it is vulnerable to in"ltration by A¸¸C, allowing defectors to reinvade. It should be noted that all of these strategies have a &&2-ply memory'' or less: they react based only on the last two turns (strategy's move OPTIMALITY UNDER NOISE 
followed by opponent's move). In fact, we can prove:
Proposition 2. No 0, 1, or 2-ply strategy is strongly optimal in the APD with no noise.
See Appendix A for proof. We note that a 2-ply strategy may be weakly optimal: the GRIM strategy (1 0 0 0) with initial cooperation probability has 1 " , ! " , and " "1, and thus meets the criteria for weak optimality. In order to "nd a strongly optimal strategy, however, we must consider strategies of 3-ply memory or higher.
OPTIMALITY CRITERIA FOR INFINITESIMAL NOISE APD
We now consider APD games with noise. Noise is de"ned as a non-zero probability that an error occurs on a given turn: a strategy will defect when it meant to cooperate, or cooperate when it meant to defect, with probability . This discrepancy between intent and result may be caused by performance errors or environmental factors; these errors in implementing a rule are unavoidable in any biological context (May, 1987) .
In an APD game with &&in"nitesimal noise'', it is possible for a player's decision to be transmitted incorrectly, but the probability of this occurring is extremely low. The in"nitesimal noise case can be thought of as the limiting case of "nite noise, with a noise probability P0, or the results can be applied as an approximation for small '0.
We note that the presence of in"nitesimal noise does not change the interactions between A¸¸C and A¸¸D: thus w(A¸¸C"A¸¸C)"R, w(A¸¸D"A¸¸D)"P, w(A¸¸D"A¸¸C)"¹, and w(A¸¸C"A¸¸D)"S as in the no noise case. However, it is important to note that w(X">) can have a discontinuity at "0: in other words, the performance of a strategy can di!er signi"cantly between the no noise case ( "0) and the in"nitesimal noise case ( P0). For example, consider the behavior of the Tit for Tat strategy, in an APD game with its clone. For the no noise case, ¹F¹ and its clone will cooperate continually, giving 1 "1. For the in"nitesimal noise case, a single error will lead to a rut of mutual defection with payo! P, while a second error will restore mutual cooperation. In an in"nitely long game we can expect ¹F¹ and its clone to be in the mutual defection rut half the time, giving each an average payo! of (R#P)/2. Thus 1 " for the ¹F¹ strategy. We use similar reasoning to compute 1 , ! , and " for ¹F¹, G¹F¹, A¸¸C, A¸¸D, PA<, and FBF. We assume that g< for the G¹F¹ and FBF strategies (Table 3) .
Thus, we can see that none of these lower memory strategies is even weakly optimal. As in the no noise case, we can prove that no strategy of less than three ply is strongly optimal. But for in"nitesimal noise, we can go even further, proving that:
Proposition 3. No 0, 1, or 2-ply strategy is (strongly or weakly) optimal in the in,nitesimal noise APD.
See Appendix A for proof. Thus, in order to "nd optimal strategies for the in"nitesimal noise APD, we must examine strategies with 3-ply or higher memory.
OPTIMALITY CRITERIA FOR FINITE NOISE APD
We now consider APD games with a noise level 0( ( , examining as to how a strategy's payo! changes as a function of . This enables us to analyse games where the approximation +0 does not hold.
First, it should be noted that the expected average payo! from continued &&mutual cooperation'' (ie. when both strategies intend to cooperate) is less than R in the presence of noise. If a strategy intends to cooperate with an error level 166 , it will actually cooperate with probability 1! , and defect with probability . Similarly, if a strategy intends to defect, it will cooperate with probability , and defect with probability 1! . Thus, the payo!s to A¸¸C and A¸¸D di!er from the no noise and in"nitesimal noise cases
Since the values of a strategy are de"ned in terms of these payo!s, we obtain the expected values for A¸¸C and A¸¸D. For A¸¸C,
For nearly all strategies, however, the values vary as a function of . In most cases, ! increases, and 1 and " decrease, with increasing . For example, we can compute the values for FBF (1 0 1 1) as a function of ( Table 4 ). Recall that for in"nitesimal noise, 1 "1, ! "0, and " "0.5. Now, since the values of a strategy vary with , how do we determine if a strategy is selfcooperating, C-exploiting, or D-unexploitable with "nite noise? One possibility is to choose a constant &&noise resistance threshold'' NR¹. Then for any given , we de"ne:
De5nition 6. A strategy is self-cooperating at noise if 1 *NR¹.
De5nition 7.
A strategy is C-exploiting at noise if ! *NR¹.
Using a noise resistance threshold of NR¹"0.9 and the ¹"5 payo! table, we "nd that FBF is self-cooperating for )0.117, but is not D-unexploitable. ¹F¹, on the other hand, is D-unexploitable for )0.0697, but is not selfcooperating.
In addition to de"ning the optimality criteria for speci"c values of , we also examine how a strategy's self-payo! w(X"X) changes as a function of . In particular, we de"ne a &&noise resistance coe$cient'' NRC 1 , which gives a lower bound for w(X"X) as a linear function of . This means that w(X"X) "e*R!(NRC 1 )e for all e. We assume that the noise level can vary from 0 to K?V "0.2. Thus we de"ne
Once we have found NRC 1 , this gives us a lower bound on the performance of a strategy for all ) K?V : we know w(X"X)*R!(NRC 1 ) . Thus if a strategy has NRC 1 "5, and assuming R"3, we know w(X"X)*3!5 . It should also be noted that, for strategies which are not totally self-cooperating under in"nitesimal noise, NRC 1 "R. It is clear that a strategy with lower NRC 1 is more resistant to noise. How low must NRC 1 be for a strategy to be considered &&"nite noise resistant''? To answer this question, we consider the results of a single error on the total self-payo! of a strategy. For A¸¸C against its clone, an error results in the pattern CdCcCc: the defector gains (2¹!2R) and the cooperator loses (2R!2S) as a result of this error, for an average loss of 2R!(¹#S) per player. For the (5,3,1,0) payo! In general, if a single error leads to N straight defections on average, each player loses (N#1)R!(N!1)P!(¹#S) points per error. We de"ne a strategy to be &&"nite noise resistant'' if one error leads to an average of two defections or less. This implies:
Thus a strategy is "nite noise resistant for the (5, 3, 1, 0) payo! De5nition 10. A strategy X is ,nite noise optimal if it is "nite noise resistant, totally D-unexploitable under in"nitesimal noise, and C-exploiting under in"nitesimal noise.
Thus a "nite noise optimal strategy must meet all the criteria for strong optimality under in"nitesimal noise, as well as having a low noise resistance coe$cient NRC 1 . Since no strategy of less than 3-ply memory is even weakly optimal under in"nitesimal noise, we know that none of these strategies are "nite noise optimal.
A New Class of Strategies
Thus our main goal is to "nd a higher memory strategy which is &&"nite noise optimal''. This strategy must be totally D-unexploitable, totally self-cooperating, and (at least weakly) C-exploiting under in"nitesimal noise. In other words, it must have 1 " " "1 and ! '0 for P0. It must also be &&"nite noise resistant'', having NRC 1 )3 for the (5, 3, 1, 0) payo! table and NRC 1 )4 for the (4, 3, 1, 0) payo! table.
FIRST DEFECTOR STRATEGIES
We now de"ne the &&"rst defector strategies'', a class of in"nite memory strategies. An n-ply ,rst defector strategy for the APD chooses to cooperate or defect based on the n-move history H, together with a &&memory bit'' b. This bit records which player most recently made an unprovoked defection: it is set to 1 whenever the 2-move history is Cd (opponent made an unprovoked defection) and set to 0 whenever the 3-move history is cDc or cDd (player made an unprovoked defection). The strategy is de"ned by 
), where g is the strategy's &&generosity'' (probability of cooperation after n defections). Thus a 2-ply approximation to (1 0 0 [1 0]) would be the 2-ply strategy (1 0 0 g). For n'k, we de"ne FD L recursively by concatenating two copies of FD L\ : The Firm But Fair strategy class consists of the FBF "rst defector strategy, as well as its n-ply approximations FBF L . FBF is the 2-ply "rst defector strategy (1 0 1 [1 0] ), which behaves equivalently to &&contrite TFT'' (Wu & Axelrod, 1995) and &&Reciprocity'' (Leimar, 1997) . The 2-ply approximation FBF (g) is the standard Firm  But Fair strategy (1 0 1 g) . The 3-ply and higher approximations are de"ned as follows, where is the concatenation operator:
These strategies cooperate with a cooperating opponent, and defect in response to an unprovoked defection by the opponent. In the event of a sequence of defections, they will cooperate if they were the "rst unprovoked defector (cDd, cDdDd, etc.), defect if the opponent was the "rst unprovoked defector (Cd, CdDd, etc.), or cooperate with probability g if their memory capacity is exceeded (the "rst defection occurred at least n turns ago, so they do not know who defected "rst).
THE FIRM PAVLOV STRATEGY CLASS
The Firm Pavlov class of strategies is a variation of Firm But Fair which also can exploit an unconditionally cooperating opponent. The Firm Pavlov strategy class consists of the FP "rst defector strategy, as well as its n-ply approximations FP L . FP is the 3-ply "rst defector strategy (1 0 0 1, 1 0 1 [1 0] ). The 3-ply approximation FP (g) is the strategy (1 0 0 1, 1 0 1 g). The 4-ply and higher approximations are de"ned as follows, where is the concatenation operator:
These strategies are similar to FBF L , but defect after they successfully exploit the opponent (3-move history cDc). They do not defect after a 3-move history of dDc, because this would prevent the strategy from breaking out of sequences of mutual defection against itself.
We now examine the performance of various FBF and FP strategies, searching for strategies which meet the criteria for in"nitesimal noise optimality, "nite noise optimality, and arbitrary noise optimality.
Optimality of FBF and FP

OPTIMALITY UNDER NO NOISE AND INFINITESIMAL NOISE
For the no-noise case, FBF L (g) has 1 "1 and ! "0, since it will cooperate continually against its clone or A¸¸C. Its value of " depends on both n and g. Against A¸¸D, FBF L (g) will cooperate with probability g if it has made at least W n/2 X straight defections, and defect otherwise. Thus it cooperates once every W n/2 X#1/g turns. This gives us
Thus, FBF L (g) has " "1 for g"0, and the in"nite memory FBF strategy also has " "1. FP L (g) with initial cooperation has values identical to FBF L (g). However, FP L (g) with initial defection will exploit A¸¸C continually, giving it ! "1. Thus for all n, FP L (0) with initial defection has ! " " " 1 "1, and thus it is strongly optimal for no noise. Similarly, the in"nite memory FP with initial defection has ! " " " 1 "1, and is strongly optimal for the no noise APD.
OPTIMALITY UNDER NOISE For in"nitesimal noise, we "rst note that an FBF or FP strategy's value of " will be unchanged from the no noise case. The FBF strategies have ! "0 as in the no noise case, but the FP strategies have ! " . This results since, in cooperation, only an error by FP will cause it to start exploiting A¸¸C, but while exploiting, an error by either player will cause it to resume cooperation. Thus FP is twice as likely to leave the exploiting rut as to enter, and it will spend one-third of the time exploiting A¸¸C.
We now consider self-cooperation under in"nitesimal noise, computing the proportion of time that an FBF or FP strategy will be in mutual cooperation with its clone. We "rst examine the FP (0) strategy (1 0 0 1, 1 0 1 0), demonstrating that 1 "1. But how can FP (0) be totally selfcooperating if its generosity (probability of cooperation after dDd) is 0? It is possible for FP (0) to fall into a rut of mutual defection with its clone, but it requires two errors to enter the rut and only a single error to restore cooperation. It thus enters the rut once every 1/ turns, and leaves the rut every 1/ turns. Hence, in an in"-nitely long game, we can expect FP (0) to be in the defection rut with probability:
Thus FP (0) has 1 "1, " "1, and ! " . We have found a strategy that meets the criteria for strong optimality in the in"nitesimal noise case! We now compute the proportion of time that an FBF or FP strategy will be in a rut of mutual defection with its clone in the in"nitesimal noise APD. In general, it takes U n/2 V errors to enter the mutual defection rut, and the strategies can escape the rut with probability g (g* ). Thus the proportion of time spent in this state is
For +0, this quantity is negligible unless n)2 and g is O( ). Thus for FBF and FP strategies of 3-ply or higher memory, 1 "1. Similarly, 1 "1 for FBF and FP . For the 2-ply FBF strategy, 1 " for g" , and 1 "1 for g< .
A strategy which is strongly optimal for in"nitesimal noise must have 1 " " "1 and ! '0. Thus FP L (0) is strongly optimal for all n, and FP is also strongly optimal for the in"nitesimal noise APD.
OPTIMALITY UNDER FINITE NOISE
For the "nite noise case, we "rst calculate the noise resistance coe$cient NRC 1 for FP and FBF strategies with various values of n and g. Recall that for a strategy X with noise resistance coe$cient NRC 1 , w(X"X)*R!(NRC 1 ) for all )0.2, and a strategy with NRC 1 )3 is noise resistant (Table 5) .
For ¹"5, all FBF strategies with n*5 are noise resistant, as are all FP strategies with n*7. FP is noise resistant for g'0.4, FBF is noise resistant for g'0.25, and FP is noise resistant for g'0.047. Compare these strategies to FBF , which is noise resistant only for g"1.
For ¹"4, however, FP is noise resistant for all values of the generosity g. Thus the FP (0) strategy meets all the criteria for "nite noise optimality: it is "nite noise resistant, and under in"nitesimal noise, it is C-exploiting, totally self-cooperating, and totally D-unexploitable. We have thus accomplished the "rst part of our goal, to "nd a "nite memory strategy which is "nite noise optimal. FP L (0) is also "nite noise optimal for n'5, as is FP . We also note that the FP (0) and FBF (0) strategies are self-cooperating ( 1 *0.9) and Dunexploitable ( " *0.9) for noise levels up to approximately 0.09. Thus both strategies have nearly maximum payo! against A¸¸D, and 170 D. B. NEILL nearly maximum self-payo!, even for relatively high noise levels.
Next, we examine the strategies' evolutionary interaction with A¸¸D. At low noise levels, only a small proportion of FP (0) or FBF (0) is needed to invade a population of defectors: for ¹"4 and "0.01, these strategies can invade A¸¸D as long as they make up of the population. This proportion increases (approximately) linearly for increasing noise. The FP and FBF strategies can also resist an A¸¸D invasion for ¹"4 and )0.1. For *0.1, some very generous versions of these strategies will allow A¸¸D to invade, but the 5-ply FP and FBF strategies are immune to A¸¸D invasion for all )0.2.
OPTIMALITY UNDER ARBITRARY NOISE
We also note that the in"nite memory FBF and FP strategies have another useful feature: each strategy can recover from any "nite sequence of errors, and restore cooperation with its clone, within two turns. Such a strategy can be thought of as not merely &&noise resistant'', but &&noise proof ''. This is in contrast to strategies such as FP (0). If two errors occur in quick succession in a game between FP (0) and its clone, the players can get stuck in a &&Dd rut'', unable to restore cooperation until another error occurs. If the probability of an error is constant over the course of a game, FP (0) will be in the rut of mutual defection with probability 0. If the error probability varies widely, however, FP (0) can be permanently stuck in a rut of mutual defection (for example, if errors occur on the "rst and third turns of a game, then never again). This argument applies to any non-generous, "nite memory strategy. In fact, we can prove:
Proposition 4. No strategy X with ,nite memory is noise proof and totally D-unexploitable.
See Appendix A for proof. Thus in a rapidly changing environment, it may be essential for strategies to be noise proof, and in"nite memory strategies would be expected to evolve. In most real life examples, however, the probability of a long string of errors is low enough ( I for a string of k errors) such that it is su$cient for a strategy to be &&noise resistant'', and in"nite memory is unnecessary.
Performance of FBF and FP
We have shown above that higher-memory strategies of the FP and FBF strategy classes meet many or all of our optimality criteria. In particular, we have found that the FP L (0) strategies are "nite noise optimal for n'5 (for ¹"4) or n'7 (for ¹"5). The corresponding FBF strategies meet almost all of the optimality criteria, but are not C-exploiting.
We must now ask an essential question: do strategies which meet these optimality criteria perform well in (evolutionary and non-evolutionary) APD simulations? To answer this question, we "rst ran several round-robin tournaments, using a format similar to Axelrod's (1981) . The "rst four tournaments consisted of 63 strategies: g1, g2, g3, PA<, RAND, A¸¸D, A¸¸C, 11 FBF strategies (generosity 0-1), 10 FBF strategies (generosity 0-0.9), 11 FP strategies (generosity 0-1), 11 FBF strategies (generosity 0-1), 11 FP strategies (generosity 0-1), FBF , and FP . Tournaments were run at noise levels of 0.01 and 0.05, and with the payo! tables (4, 3, 1, 0) and (5, 3, 1, 0). The FP strategies won all four tournaments: for the two tournaments with noise 0.01, FP (0.2) was the champion, and for the two tournaments with noise 0.05, FP
(1) was the champion. In general, FP strategies outperformed FBF strategies: FP L (g) outscored FBF L (g) for any given n and g. Also, for the "nite memory strategies, performance improved with increasing n. However, the in"nite memory strategies FBF and FP performed poorly in these tournaments. We hypothesized that this resulted from poor performance against the strategies with low memory and low generosity. For example, consider FBF against the Tit for Tat strategy, FBF (0). An error by FBF would be quickly corrected, but an error by ¹F¹ would result in a rut of mutual defection. To test this hypothesis, a "fth tournament was run with 58 of the 63 strategies, excluding the "ve non-generous (g"0) FBF/FP strategies. A 0.01 noise level, and the (5, 3, 1, 0) payo! table, were used. As expected, FP was the champion. We also noted that the optimum value of g varied with the memory n.
OPTIMALITY UNDER NOISE
While the 2-ply FBF strategy performed best for g"1, the higher memory strategies performed best for g"0.2 ( "0.01) or g"0.7 ( "0.05).
Next From these results, it is clear that both the FBF and FP strategies perform well in roundrobin tournaments, with FP performing signi"-cantly better than FBF. The ability to exploit unconditional cooperators (without signi"cantly reducing the strategy's ability to cooperate with conditional cooperators) is essential for success in a round-robin tournament simulation. The FP (0.2) strategy was particularly successful in the round-robin tournaments we conducted. It is perfectly self-cooperating, mostly D-unexploitable, and somewhat C-exploiting; the non-zero generosity value also allows it to cooperate with low-memory/low-generosity conditional cooperators such as ¹F¹.
Evolutionary Optimality Criteria
A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF STANDARD EVOLUTIONARY MODELS
Theoretical biologists have proposed a number of evolutionary models for population dynamics in the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma. In all of these models, evolution is driven by natural selection: strategies which earn higher average payo!s have higher &&evolutionary "tness'', and are able to survive and reproduce. The &&Genetic Algorithm'' model used by Axelrod (1987) and others represents each strategy as a &&chromosome'', a collection of genes describing the strategy's behavior in any given situation. This model creates genetic variation in a strategy's o!spring by both mutation (randomly occurring changes in an individual's genes) and crossover (genetic recombination of features from two di!erent &&parent'' strategies). This approach enables continued evolution of new strategies, but relies heavily on chance: the evolution of a population is strongly dependent on which random mutations or recombinations occur, as well as the speci"c parameters of the genetic model.
Nevertheless, one advantage of genetic algorithm models is that they suggest methods through which strategies may evolve. Lindgren (1981) investigated the evolution of n-ply strategies through a genetic algorithm model which allowed for gene duplications and splits (increasing or decreasing the memory n) as well as point mutations. He found that higher memory strategies can evolve in this model, and these longer genomes can often be more successful than lower memory players. Thus Lindgren's work complements the results presented here: he presents the methods by which higher memory strategies can evolve, while we focus on the conditions under which higher memory is evolutionarily bene"cial (and hence, likely to evolve). In particular, higher memory that is likely to evolve when meeting all three of the optimality criteria is important: when an organism is likely to interact with others employing a wide range of di!erent strategies.
A second model is the invasion model proposed by Nowak and Sigmund (1992, 1993) . This model assumes that a large homogeneous population of a given stategy X is visited periodically by mutant strains. In this model, a mutant strain > is selected randomly from the hyperspace of all possible n-ply strategies, then Maynard Smith's invasion criteria (1982) are used to calculate whether > can invade X. This invasion will occur if w(>"X)'w(X"X), or w(>"X)"w(X"X) and w(>">)'w(X">). The model assumes that if > invades X, > will take over the population; otherwise, the initial population will continue. Invasion models of this sort tend to result in cyclical or complex invasion behavior: for example, A¸¸D is invaded by ¹F¹, which is invaded by G¹F¹, which is invaded by A¸¸C, which is invaded by A¸¸D. Though it is a fairly realistic model of population dynamics, this model is very dependent on which mutants are chosen to invade, and its complex time-dependent behavior makes it very di$cult to decide as to which strategy is in some sense &&optimal''. One solution to this problem is given by the notion of an &&evolutionarily stable strategy'' (ESS). An ESS is a strategy X which cannot be invaded by any other strategy: that is, for all strategies >, w(>"X)(w(X"X), or w(>"X)"w(X"X) and w(>">))w(X">). An ESS is in one sense an &&evolutionarily optimal'' strategy: once it is established in a population, no other single strategy can invade. However, as shown by Boyd and Lorberbaum (1987) , an ESS may be invaded by a combination of two mutant strategies. More importantly, an ESS may have di$culty establishing itself in a population, because it has di$-culty invading other strategies. In fact, some evolutionarily stable strategies are &&inaccessible'' in the sense that they are unable to invade any other homogeneous population (Nowak, 1990) .
Thus, it is clear that a measure of evolutionary &&optimality'' should take into account not only a strategy's resistance to invasion (evolutionary stability) but its ability to invade other strategies (evolutionary potency). One model which considers both of these factors is the &&Adaptive Dynamics'' model used in Nowak & Sigmund (1989) and Hofbauer & Sigmund (1990) . This model assumes that an initial homogeneous population of strategy S has numerous o!spring X, each slightly di!erent from S. Each of these o!spring interacts with all other o!spring, and the variety with the highest total payo! survives. Assuming a symmetric distribution of o!spring around S, the o!spring with the highest total payo! will be the o!spring with the highest payo! against the parent. We thus de"ne the "tness function F(X) to be w(X"S). This leads to the adaptive dynamics equation
where the gradient F is evaluated at X"S, and h is a constant corresponding to the rate of variation (Kraines & Kraines, 2000) . Thus the population evolves in the direction which is most advantageous for the single mutant (Nowak & Sigmund, 1989) . One use of this model is to examine an individual strategy by allowing it to evolve according to the adaptive dynamics equation: this process of &&self-evolution'' gives information about the stability of the strategy, as well as its possible evolutionary path. We will examine the self-evolution of FBF , FBF , and FP using this model. Again, the behavior of this dynamical system is time-dependent and dependent on the initial strategy chosen, making it di$cult to argue that a given strategy is &&opti-mal''. But, as in the Nowak}Sigmund model, we can "nd strategies which are &&optimal'' in the sense of resistance to invasion. A &&relative evolutionarily stable strategy'' (RESS) is a strategy which cannot be invaded (according to the Maynard Smith criterion) by any nearby strategy. In other words, strategy X is an RESS in some space H of strategies if, for some '0, for all strategies Y with "X!>"( , either w(>"X)(w(X"X), or w(>"X)"w(X"X) and w(>">))w(X">). Once we have found an RESS X, we can also examine its &&basin of attraction'': the set of strategies in H which evolve into X. An RESS with a large basin of attraction is in some sense &&optimal'', since it is resistant to (local) invasion and can eventually take over many selfevolving populations. As Kraines and Kraines state, the adaptive dynamics model is &&consistent with modern evolutionary theory for a population with limited genetic diversity and frequent minor mutations'' (2000). However, it excludes the possibility of invasion by strategies which are not similar to the original strategy, and thus does not allow for major mutations, migrants, or interactions of multiple populations. We will propose another evolutionary model which addresses these shortcomings, but "rst we examine the selfevolution of various FBF and FP strategies.
SELF-EVOLUTION OF FBF AND FP
To examine the self-evolution of the FBF and FP strategies, we use a discrete approximation to the adaptive dynamics equation as in Kraines & Kraines (2000) . This algorithm takes three parameters: the starting strategy S(0)" [S (0), 2 , S L (0)], the step size , and the rate of variation h. For each time step t, it modi"es S using the following equations:
where xL G is the vector with a 1 in position i and zeros elsewhere. For each simulation, we selfevolve the strategy with ¹"4, "0.01, "0.01, and h"0.1. We "rst self-evolved the FBF (0) strategy, (1 0 1 0). Its probabilities of cooperation after Cd and Dd quickly increased, leveling o! after 2;10 generations to (1 0.2607 1 0.6554). Next, we self-evolved the FBF (0) strategy, (1 0 1 1, 1 0 1 0). Its probability of cooperation after dDd increased rapidly at "rst, then much more slowly, leveling o! after 10 generations. The resulting strategy was (1 0 1 1, 1 0 1 0.6566) .
We note several interesting facts from the selfevolution of these two strategies. Both strategies increase in generosity, evolving toward increasing self-cooperation and decreasing D-unexploitability. Both generosity parameters seem to level o! at approximately , but the FBF (0) strategy also evolves some unconditional cooperation (cooperating over of the time after Cd). Thus FBF (0) evolves away from the FBF family of strategies, but FBF (0) remains an FBF strategy under evolution. The FBF strategy also evolves much more slowly than FBF , suggesting a higher degree of evolutionary stability.
Finally, we self-evolved the FP (0) strategy, (1 0 0 1, 1 0 1 0). Its probability of cooperation after dDd increased rapidly at "rst, then much more slowly, leveling o! after 10 generations. However, its probability of cooperation after cDc also increased (slowly and at a fairly constant rate), to 1! after 5;10 generations. The resulting strategy is (1 0 1 1, 1 0 1 0.6566).
Thus both the FP (0) and FBF (0) strategies evolve to the relative evolutionarily stable strategy FBF (0.6566). We can conclude from this that FBF is much more stable than FP under self-evolution. This result is likely to apply in the general case: there is no evolutionary advantage to exploitation when all strategies are su$ciently similar.
EVOLUTIONARY FITNESS AND THE DOMINANCE CRITERION
We now consider the question of a general measure of evolutionary performance. Are any of the previously mentioned models suitable for this measure? To answer this question, we consider what properties the measure should have, and apply these to the "ve models/techniques discussed above: genetic algorithms, Nowak}Sig-mund invasion model, ESS theory, self-evolution, and RESS theory. We argue that three properties are essential. First, the measure must take into account both a strategy's evolutionary stability (resistance to invasion) and evolutionary potency (ability to invade other strategies). Second, the measure must be able to evaluate a strategy's performance against a large number of di!erent strategies, not only a carefully chosen few. In particular, it must consider interactions with strategies which are substantially di!erent from the given strategy, not only its evolutionary kin. Third, the measure must not be time-varying: it should not depend on the current composition of the population, but only on the set of strategies which is initially present.
ESS theory violates the "rst property, since it only takes evolutionary stability into account. Self-evolution violates the second property, since it evaluates only the given strategy, not its relation to other strategies. The RESS theory also violates the second property, since it considers the interaction of a strategy only with strategies very similar to it. Using the genetic algorithm or Nowak}Sigmund invasion models, the proportion of a strategy tends to vary signi"-cantly (and possibly chaotically) over time, so it is di$cult to postulate a non-time-varying measure which accurately re#ects a strategy's performance. Thus none of the commonly used models of the evolutionary APD lend themselves easily to a general measure of evolutionary performance.
In order to derive our measure, we return to the Maynard Smith invasion criteria (1982) . From Maynard Smith, strategy X invades strategy > if w(X">)'w(>">), or w(X">)"w(>">) and w(X"X)'w(>"X). If strategy X invades strategy >, we write X'>. Otherwise, we write X / '>. We must "rst observe that whether X invades > and whether > invades X are independent: thus there are four possibilities:
I. X'> and > / 'X. In this case, any initial proportion of strategy X can take over, and completely wipe out, strategy >. We say that X dominates >, and write X<>.
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II. X / '> and >'X, In this case, any initial proportion of strategy > can take over, and completely wipe out, strategy X. We say that > dominates X, and write ><X.
III. X'> and >'X. In this case, no matter what the initial proportions of strategies X and >, the two strategies reach a balance in which the population is a mix of X and >. We say that X and > are stable, and write X >. To be more precise, we can calculate the proportion p of strategy X at equilibrium
Thus we write X N >.
IV. X / '> and > / 'X. In this case, either strategy X or strategy > will take over the population, driving the other strategy to extinction, depending on the initial proportions of the two strategies. We say that X and > are bistable, and write X0>. To be more precise, we can calculate the minimum proportion m of strategy X needed to take over the population
m" w(>">)!w(X">) w(X"X)!w(>"X)#w(>">)!w(X">)
Thus we write X K 0>. We must also deal with the case w(X">)"w(>">) and w(>"X)"w(X"X), in which case m is de"ned as 0.5.
We now de"ne the dominance measure dom (X">), which is a measure of the relative evolutionary performance of strategies X and >.
Thus the measure dom (X">) is between 0 and 1, with higher dominance scores corresponding to a better evolutionary performance of X against >. It should also be noted that dom(X">)#dom(>"X)"1, thus the dominance score presents a &&constant-sum'' measure of relative evolutionary performance (i.e. if X performs well against >, > performs poorly against X). The measure dom (X">) measures evolutionary "tness in a substantively di!erent manner than other models. Most evolutionary models assume that a homogeneous population is invaded by a small number of mutants: these mutants can be nearly identical to the original population (as in the adaptive dynamics model) or very di!erent (as in the Nowak}Sigmund invasion model). The dominance measure, on the other hand, assumes the mixing of two large homogeneous populations, and the evolution of the resulting population until it reaches a stable state.
Finally, we de"ne the dominance score of a strategy X to be its average dominance score against all strategies it interacts with. Assuming a population of opponents > G with varying fre-
Thus a strategy's dominance score is a measure of its average relative evolutionary "tness. It has several advantages over other "tness measures: since it is time-invariant, we can compute a single score (independent of the current proportions of each strategy) for any two strategies. This allows us to measure the evolutionary performance of a strategy in a round-robin tournament format similar to Axelrod's (1984) , except that dominance scores (rather than average payo!s) are computed for each pair of strategies. Since the dominance measure is a constant-sum, the performance of a strategy is not a!ected as much by the set of strategies it interacts with: we expect successful strategies to have high dominance scores against most other strategies, while in the normal round-robin tournament format, even &&successful'' strategies will have poor average payo!s against strategies such as A¸¸D. The disadvantage of the dominance measure is that it does not take into account the more complex interactions that result from the mixing of more than two strategies: in a multi-strategy interaction, a strategy's dominance score is essentially its performance after the "rst round of evolutionary &&battles''. But once the system evolves and OPTIMALITY UNDER NOISE weaker strategies die o!, the strategy may be interacting with a very di!erent set of strategies, dramatically a!ecting its evolutionary performance. However, there appears to be no way of taking this evolutionary complexity into account without sacri"cing our main objective: a simple and useful measure of overall evolutionary "tness. While a strategy with a very high dominance score may not succeed in every evolutionary interaction, it is likely to perform well in the great majority of such interactions. Thus we consider evolutionary dominance as another criterion for optimality: an &&optimal'' strategy must have a high dominance score against a large and varied set of opponents. In particular, we consider an n-ply strategy to satisfy this criterion if it has a high dominance score against the set of all n-ply strategies.
Evolutionary Performance of FBF and FP
We now examine the evolutionary performance of the FBF and FP strategies through several &&round-robin dominance tournaments''. In a round-robin dominance tournament, we assume that the frequency of each strategy is equal, and compute dom(X) for each strategy X. We then compare each strategy's dominance score; the strategy with the highest dominance wins the tournament.
ROUND-ROBIN DOMINANCE TOURNAMENTS
We "rst conducted round-robin dominance tournaments among the same 63 strategies as for our initial round-robin tournaments. The tournaments were run with the (4, 3, 1, 0) and (5, 3, 1, 0) payo! tables, and a noise level of 0.01 was used.
Both tournaments were won by the FBF strategy: this strategy dominated most of the other 62 strategies, and had dom (X">)'0.5 against every other strategy. FBF strategies outperformed FP strategies: FBF L (g) outscored FP L (g) for all n and g. Additionally, performance improved with increasing memory:
In addition, strategies with relatively high generosities tended to perform better. The optimum value of g varied with the memory n: g"1 was optimal for 2-ply strategies, g"0.6 was optimal for 3-ply strategies, and g"0.7 was optimal for 5-ply strategies.
These results are not unexpected: since FP evolves into FBF in the adaptive dynamics model, we would expect that FBF strategies have a higher dominance score than FP in a headto-head competition. That is, dom(FBF"FP)' dom(FP"FBF), so dom(FBF)'dom(FP) in tournaments consisting mainly of FBF and FP strategies.
DOMINANCE VERSUS CORNER AND EDGE STRATEGIES
We now ask a more interesting question: how do the FBF and FP strategies perform against the set of all n-ply strategies? It is very di$cult to compute the dominance score of a given strategy against all n-ply strategies. An n-ply strategy has 2L parameters, each of which can vary continuously from 0 to 1, so to compute this score we must integrate w(X">) over a continuous 2L-dimensional subspace of R L . Rather than performing the integration, we approximate the strategy's performance by considering only &&corner strategies'' (n-ply strategies for which each parameter is either 0 or 1), or &&edge strateges'' (n-ply strategies for which each parameter is either 0, , or 1). There are 2 L n-ply corner strategies, and 3 L n-ply edge strategies.
We considered the performance of each of the 63 strategies in the previous tournament: for each, we calculated an average dominance score against the 256 3-ply corner strategies, and the 6561 3-ply edge strategies. A 0.01 noise level was used.
The FP (0.1) strategy was the champion for three of the four tournaments (vs. corner strategies with ¹"5, vs. edge strategies with ¹"5 and 4). FPR won the other tournament (vs. corner strategies with ¹"4). Both strategies performed consistently well, with dominance scores between 0.88 and 0.96 for all four tournaments. In general, FP strategies outperformed FBF strategies: all of the top 15 strategies or each tournament were FP strategies. Performance generally improved with increasing memory for the "nite memory strategies, though in some tournaments the 5-ply strategies (with generosity 0.1 or 0.2) could beat the in"nite-memory strategies. The optimum values of g for each strategy were signi"cantly lower than for the previous round-robin dominance tournaments: g"0.4 for 2-ply strategies, and g"0.1 for 3-ply memory and higher.
It is clear from these results that the FP strategies (particularly those with low but non-zero generosities) perform extremely well on an average in evolutionary interactions against 3-ply strategies. Though FBF strategies outperform FP strategies in head-to-head dominance tournaments, FP has a signi"cantly higher dominance score when averaged over all strategies.
DOMINANCE OF 3-PLY CORNER AND EDGE STRATEGIES
Next, we examine the space of 3-ply strategies in more detail, comparing the dominance scores of all corner and edge strategies rather than focusing on a speci"c group of strategies. Roundrobin dominance tournaments were run for the 256 3-ply corner strategies, and for the 6561 3-ply edge strategies. The tournaments were run for both ¹"4 and 5, and a 0.01 noise level was used.
Interestingly, the top performer out of all the corner strategies for ¹"4 was (1 0 0 1, 1 0 1 0): this is the FP (0) strategy! Its average dominance score was 0.9380, signi"cantly (0.04) higher than any other strategy. The second place strategy was FBF (0). Since dominance score is a measure of overall evolutionary "tness, this suggests that FP (0) is in some sense evolutionarily optimal among the 3-ply corner strategies. Even more interestingly, FP (0) was also the top performer among the 6561 3-ply edge strategies, with a dominance score of 0.9514. This suggests that it is also likely to have the highest dominance score over the entire space of 3-ply strategies, implying that FP (0) is the evolutionarily optimal 3-ply strategy for ¹"4.
For ¹"5, FP (0) was again the top corner strategy, "nishing signi"cantly (0.034) higher than any other strategy with a dominance score of 0.8910. The second place strategy was a slightly more cooperative version of GRIM (1 0 0 0, 1 1 0 0). However, the top edge strategy was not FP (0) but a slightly more exploiting variant (1 0 0 1, 1 0 0.5 0), with a dominance score of 0.9327. FP (0) "nished eighth, with a dominance score of 0.8796. This suggests that the 3-ply edge strategy with the highest dominance score over the entire space of 3-ply strategies is likely to be of the form (1 0 0 1, 1 0 k 0), where 0.5(k(1. To test this hypothesis, we next compared the dominance scores of strategies (1 0 0 1, 1 0 k 0) against all 3-ply edge strategies. The winner of this tournament was k"0.59, with a dominance score of 0.9361. This strategy, (1 0 0 1, 1 0 0.59 0), is likely to be evolutionarily optimal in the space of all 3-ply strategies. Thus FP (0) appears to be optimal for ¹"4, but for ¹"5, strategies which sometimes defect after dDc perform slightly better.
Conclusions
When is a strategy &&optimal'' in the Alternating Prisoner's Dilemma with noise? Since no strategy can achieve a maximum score against every other strategy, we search instead for optimality criteria which are strongly correlated with a high average performance in various Prisoner's Dilemma models (including round-robin tournaments and evolutionary invasion models). In order to perform well against a variety of other strategies, an &&optimal'' strategy must be able to achieve mutual cooperation with its clone, resist exploitation by defectors, and exploit unconditional cooperators. These three criteria (self-cooperating, Dunexploitable, C-exploiting) were de"ned and examined for Alternating Prisoner's Dilemma games with no noise, in"nitesimal noise, "nite noise, and arbitrary noise. Most of the strategies commonly discussed in the Alternating Prisoner's Dilemma literature are &&2-ply strategies'' such as Pavlov and Firm But Fair, &&low memory'' strategies which make decisions based only on the last two turns. However, none of these strategies can simultaneously meet all three of the optimality criteria: a 2-ply strategy which is totally unexploitable by defectors, and can exploit unconditional cooperators, cannot attain any level of self-cooperation in the in"nitesimal noise APD.
Higher memory strategies such as Firm Pavlov, however, can meet all the three optimality criteria: the FP (0) strategy (1 0 0 1, 1 0 1 0) is &&totally self-cooperating'', &&totally D-unexploitable'', and &&C-exploiting'', and thus is optimal for the in"nitesimal noise APD. Other members of the Firm Pavlov strategy class (5-ply memory and higher) can meet even more rigorous criteria for "nite noise optimality. These optimality criteria can be applied to analyse other Prisoner's Dilemma games with or without noise, including the simultaneous iterated Prisoner's Dilemma. The strategies which meet the criteria are likely to be successful in a variety of other performance measures. The Firm Pavlov and Firm But Fair strategy classes were shown to perform well in standard roundrobin tournament simulations, adaptive dynamics models, and evolutionary invasion models. In addition to considering the standard models, we also proposed the dominance criterion, a general measure of evolutionary performance. This measure takes into account both evolutionary stability (ability to resist invasion) and evolutionary potency (ability to invade other strategies), producing a combined measure which can be used to examine the relative evolutionary performance for any set of strategies. We conducted a number of &&dominance tournaments'', a round-robin tournament format similar to Axelrod's, except that dominance scores (instead of average payo!s) are computed for each pair of strategies. In particular, the Firm Pavlov strategies achieved extremely high dominance scores against the set of all 3-ply edge strategies, suggesting that these strategies will be extremely successful in a wide variety of evolutionary interactions. In fact, when a round-robin dominance tournament was conducted among all 3-ply edge strategies, the winner was a 3-ply Firm Pavlov strategy.
To succeed in the Prisoner's Dilemma, a strategy must be &&friendly'' enough to cooperate with its clone, &&pragmatic'' enough to exploit unconditional cooperators, and &&wary'' enough to resist exploitation by defectors. The Firm Pavlov strategy FP (0) can be thought of as a model for this type of behavior: it responds to cooperation with cooperation, except when it can continue exploiting an unconditional cooperator. Similarly, it responds to defection with defection, except when the opponent's defection is in response to its provocation. This 3-ply strategy combines the advantages of several 2-ply strategies: like Firm But Fair, it is self-cooperating under noise; like Tit for Tat, it is unexploitable; and like Pavlov, it can exploit unconditional cooperators. The Firm Pavlov strategies not only meet our stringent optimality criteria, but also achieve remarkable success in round-robin tournaments and evolutionary interactions: these higher memory strategies are truly &&optimal under noise'' in the Alternating Prisoner's Dilemma.
Many thanks to David and Vivian Kraines for their helpful comments and suggestions.
1 "0. Thus no totally D-unexploitable 2-ply strategy can be both self-cooperating and C-exploiting. Proof. Assume that strategy X has an n-ply memory for some "nite n. Now consider the strategy's generosity g, its probability of cooperating after a sequence of n defections. If g"0, then in a game against its clone, any sequence of n defections will result in a rut of mutual defection. Thus some sequence of errors with length )n will result in a continued mutual defection, and hence the strategy is not noise proof. If g'0, we know by Lemma 1 that the strategy is not totally D-unexploitable. 180 D. B. NEILL
